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INTRODUCTION
Around noon on September 26, 2002, a dual Canadian–Syrian citizen
named Maher Arar walked between terminals at Kennedy Airport in New
York as he returned from vacation.1 However, instead of returning to work
in Montreal, Arar spent the night in the airport.2 He had been detained by
Immigration and Naturalization Service officials and FBI agents on suspicion of associating with al Qaeda.3 Only twelve days later, Arar slept—if
he slept at all—in a six-by-three foot underground cell in Syria.4 U.S. officials had questioned him for days in New York before he was sent to Jordan
in a small plane and then delivered to Syria.5 During his first interrogations—which Arar alleges were facilitated by the United States—he was
beaten with a two-inch-thick electric cable.6 All told, Arar lived in his
small Syrian cell for ten months and was not recovered by Canadian officials for an entire year.7 Although his ordeal has become a notorious story
about U.S. antiterrorism efforts, it is impossible to truly understand the fear
and pain of Arar’s experience. It is, perhaps, easier to empathize with his
desire for reparations from the U.S. government.
In recent years, several people like Arar, detained or mistreated by the
United States during the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT),8 have brought
Bivens actions seeking compensation from executive officials for alleged
constitutional torts.9 These suits are “inevitable”10 and will become increasingly common as the repercussions of the GWOT continue filtering
through the judicial system.11 Opponents and victims of the GWOT view a
1

Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
Id.
3
Id. at 566.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
The term “Global War on Terror” includes the government’s and military actors’ accusations and
enforcement activities—e.g., detention, torture, forcible transport, and illegal searches—directed at suspected enemies as part of U.S. efforts to deter and extinguish terrorist threats or related to U.S. military
activity in the Middle East. This focus on people suspected of terrorism-related activity is not meant to
ignore or minimize the extent to which civilians and military personnel and their families have been and
continue to become victims of the GWOT.
9
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd (al-Kidd III), 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); Arar, 585 F.3d 559; Turkmen
v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009); Rasul v. Myers (Rasul II), 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Khorrami v. Rolince, 539 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2008); Padilla v. Yoo, 633
F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); In re
Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007); Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 1:04-CV01809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009); Complaint, Hamad v. Gates, No. 2:10-CV-00591 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2010), 2010 WL
2935653.
10
George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter-Terrorism via Lawsuit”—The Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL.
L. REV. 841, 847 (2009).
11
Id. at 841.
2
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Bivens right of action as an appropriate safeguard for human rights and the
rule of law and have focused on securing the availability of such suits for
wronged individuals.12 Although GWOT plaintiffs face inherent challenges
in seeking to invoke the nearly dead Bivens right of action,13 these obstacles
to relief are not insurmountable.
The qualified immunity defense almost universally claimed by the defendant officials in detainees’ Bivens actions14 has received less attention
from courts and commentators than the questions of whether constitutional
rights and Bivens actions should be available to detainees, but it likely
presents the more formidable barrier to compensatory relief. In January
2009, in Pearson v. Callahan,15 the Supreme Court overturned the qualified
immunity test that had been mandatory since 2001.16 The old test, taken
from Saucier v. Katz, required courts to consider the constitutional merits of
the plaintiff’s claim before determining whether the constitutional right involved was “clearly established” when the defendant official acted.17 The
Pearson Court, in removing this sequencing requirement, asserted that
courts could decide most cases solely on the “clearly established” question.18 However, recognizing that the mandatory sequence of the Saucier
test serves important notice-giving and rights-development functions, the
Court explained that merits-first sequencing remains “especially valuable”

12

See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Six Friend of the Court Briefs Ask Supreme Court to Hear Case of Rendition Survivor Maher Arar (Mar. 8, 2010), http://ccrjustice.org/
newsroom/press-releases/six-friend-court-briefs-ask-supreme-court-hear-case-rendition-survivor-maher.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to hear Arar’s petition. Arar v. Ashcroft, 130 S. Ct. 3409
(2010).
Indeed, the Bivens cause of action is, to some degree, a remedy for the “presentist bias (or ‘myopia’)
[that] often afflicts officials, who order short-term fixes like mass detentions or curbs on free speech
with troubling long-term consequences.” Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195, 198 (2010) (footnote
omitted). Potential downsides to the extension of a Bivens right of action to GWOT detainees include
enemy use of litigation as a tactic (or weapon) of distraction. See, e.g., Kristina A. Kiik, Comment,
Quantum of Competence: Balancing Bivens During the War on Terror, 62 SMU L. REV. 1945, 1946–47
(2009).
13
See Brown, supra note 10, at 845; see also id. at 845 n.15 (citing sources expressing concern
about whether Bivens actions continue to be viable). But see Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV.
809, 837–43 (2010) (reporting that plaintiff success rates in Bivens actions are higher than commentators
have reported).
14
See, e.g., al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2089; Arar, 585 F.3d at 563; Turkmen, 589 F.3d at 54445;
Rasul II, 563 F.3d at 528; Khorrami, 539 F.3d at 786; Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1030; Farag, 587 F.
Supp. 2d at 443; Iraq & Afg. Detainees, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 92; Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *10.
15
129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
16
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
17
Id. at 200.
18
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
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for claims that are unlikely to arise in other law-developing suits where
qualified immunity is unavailable.19
This Comment argues that courts should follow the Saucier sequence
when evaluating Bivens claims brought by victims of the GWOT because
these claims fit into the “especially valuable” category. To date, lower
courts have disagreed as to whether they should apply Saucier sequencing
to these claims. However, this Comment shows that the constitutional
rights of the victims of the GWOT and the constitutionality of executive detention policies are unlikely to develop through alternative legal procedures.
Therefore, the lower courts should address the constitutional merits of these
claims before proceeding to the question of whether any constitutional
rights that may have been violated were “clearly established” when the defendant official acted. Additionally, the Supreme Court should explicitly
endorse the continued value of the Saucier sequence for assessing qualified
immunity in GWOT Bivens claims.
Part I of this Comment introduces Bivens actions and the defense of
qualified immunity and reviews the recent Pearson decision recasting the
Saucier sequence as discretionary. Part II explains why victims of the
GWOT are precisely the type of plaintiffs in whose suits qualified immunity determinations should continue to require a merits-first test. Part II analyzes injunctive and declaratory relief, habeas corpus petitions, and motions
to suppress evidence, in order to show that detainee rights are unlikely to
develop through these alternative rights of action. Part III examines contradictory decisions by the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit and shows that
the lower courts have applied Saucier sequencing inconsistently to the qualified immunity defense in detainees’ Bivens actions. This Part then predicts
how this lower court confusion will affect the Judiciary Branch’s noticegiving and rights-development functions in the U.S. antiterrorism efforts.
Part IV addresses common criticisms leveled against Saucier sequencing
and demonstrates why they are misconceived in the context of GWOT victims’ Bivens actions. Part IV then explains why the Judiciary Branch
should assume any role at all rather than defer to the Executive and Legislative Branches in shaping wartime detainee rights and the parameters for future wartime executive action. It argues that judicial involvement is
important because of the infrequent opportunities to clarify and update constitutional laws related to wartime activities and the Judiciary Branch’s
quintessential role of protecting the rights of unpopular minorities.

19

832
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I.

BACKGROUND

A. Bivens Actions for Global War on Terror Detainees
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided that a person can sue for monetary
damages when federal officials violate that person’s Fourth Amendment
rights.20 Since 1971, the Court has extended the availability of Bivens suits
to vindicate other constitutional violations as well.21 Just as § 1983 permits
tort claimants to bring actions against agents acting under color of state law,
Bivens provides the only mechanism by which individuals can seek damages for federal officials’ violations of their constitutional rights.22
Unlike § 1983 claims, no federal statute expressly authorizes Bivens
suits.23 Each time a court permits a novel Bivens claim, it creates a new
right of action. Even when a plaintiff sufficiently pleads that federal officials violated her constitutional right, her claim still may be defeated by
(1) “special factors counseling hesitation”24 to create a new right of action
or (2) the congressional provision of “an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution.”25
To date, GWOT Bivens plaintiffs have primarily alleged violations relating to their detention and alleged mistreatment both by U.S. interrogators
and jailors and by foreign countries to which the United States transferred
them.26 Courts have been reluctant to recognize new Bivens rights of action
for these plaintiffs even though they have not identified a substitute cause
of action for the constitutional violations the GWOT victims assert. None
of the existing statutory schemesthe Alien Tort Statute,27 the Torture Victim Protection Act,28 the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,29 or the Feder20

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (extending Bivens to violations of the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979) (recognizing a Bivens action for a violation of the plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment).
22
James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 123 (2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
23
Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 22, at 125.
24
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18 (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 245) (internal quotation mark omitted).
25
Id. at 18–19 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; Davis, 442 U.S. at 245–47).
26
See, e.g., supra note 9 (listing cases that featured these claims).
27
See In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 112 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he Alien Tort
Statute [28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)] is not a federal statute that authorizes recovery against a federal employee.”); Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1161 (2009) [hereinafter Access to Courts].
28
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note; see Access to Courts, supra
note 27, at 1161. Under the Torture Victim Protection Act, an addendum to the Alien Tort Statute, the
defendant must have acted under “actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation,”
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2, a requirement that excludes claims against U.S. officials who
acted only under domestic law.
21
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al Tort Claims Act30—authorizes victims of wartime executive action to
seek damages from federal officials for constitutional violations. Nor do
the Geneva Conventions31 give GWOT victims a right of action for damages based on torture violations.32 The courts have foreclosed most GWOT
Bivens actions based on “special factors counseling hesitation.”33 They
have not extended Bivens actions to detainees held at Guantánamo Bay,34
and plaintiffs have not yet come forward with Bivens claims related to detention and treatment at other foreign sites. Indeed, courts have only recently begun to accept Bivens claims by U.S. citizens detained as “enemy
combatants” in the United States.35
The Supreme Court’s broad view of special factors has made Bivens
relief all but impossible to obtain for many plaintiffs.36 The special factors
29

Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (2000), invalidated in part by
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see Access to Courts, supra note 27, at 1162 n.28 (“Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the [Religious Freedom Restoration Act] was to restore strict scrutiny
review to Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, not to deter torture.” (citing Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I),
512 F.3d 644, 670–71 (D.C. Cir. 2008))).
30
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80 (2006); see Access to Courts, supra
note 27, at 1160 (“Congress enacted the FTCA [Federal Tort Claims Act] to make the government liable
for certain ‘garden-variety torts’ by federal employees, such as the negligent operation of government
motor vehicles.” (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 706 n.4 (2004))).
31
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 356, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
32
See Access to Courts, supra note 27, at 1161. But see Deborah Pearlstein, U.S. Supreme Court
Can’t Wait to Say More About the Geneva Conventions, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 29, 2010, 2:20 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/01/29/us-supreme-court-can%e2%80%99t-wait-to-say-more-about-the-genevaconventions (discussing dissents from a denial of certiorari in a case in which the Supreme Court could
have “settle[d] once and for all” whether detainees can invoke the Geneva Conventions in federal court).
The U.S. government has established several Foreign Claims Commissions (FCCs) in Iraq to compensate Iraqi citizens for injuries suffered during the U.S. war efforts there, but the claims settled by the
FCCs usually involve injuries like inadvertent killings at checkpoints or property damage in vehicle collisions. See Access to Courts, supra note 27, at 1164. Prisoners seeking reparation for wrongful or abusive detention have received very little of this compensation. In a few settlements, the United States
has paid between $350 (for lost cash and documents) and $5000 (for lost wages). Id. at 1165.
33
See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 22, at 130 (pointing specifically to Wilson v. Libby,
535 F.3d 697, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 663, 667); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585
F.3d 559, 564 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“[I]f a civil remedy in damages is to be created for harms suffered in the context of extraordinary rendition, it must be created by Congress . . . .”), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
34
See, e.g., Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 530–32 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (refusing to permit a Bivens action by former Guantánamo Bay detainees), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 11112 (D.D.C. 2010) (same).
35
In 2009, two courts within the Ninth Circuit permitted two such Bivens suits. See al-Kidd v.
Ashcroft (al-Kidd II), 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); Padilla v.
Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009). These cases are discussed more fully infra at Part III.B.
36
See William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of Government and
Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1105, 1150 (1996); Daniel L.
Rotenberg, Private Remedies for Constitutional Wrongs—A Matter of Perspective, Priority, and
Process, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 77, 108 (1986).
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inquiry has devolved from a focus on congressional participation in crafting
damages relief to sensitivity to “any concern the Court might find important
to the creation of a cause of action.”37 In GWOT Bivens suits, courts have
had no difficulty declining to create a new Bivens right of action based on
what Professor Vladeck has termed the “national security exception to Bivens.”38
However, recent jurisprudential and scholarly developments may free
courts to consider recognizing novel GWOT Bivens claims. Two scholars
have argued that Congress’s enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act and
the Westfall Act clearly demonstrates its explicit ratification of the Bivens
action39 and that this manifest approval means courts should presume a Bivens remedy is available in the absence of clear congressional intent to
preclude one.40 In the terrorism context, the Supreme Court’s extension of
constitutional habeas corpus rights to Guantánamo Bay detainees in Boumediene v. Bush in 200841 may suggest that the Constitution should protect
foreign detainees held at other extraterritorial U.S. detention facilities.42
Boumediene relied on the “objective degree of control” that the United
States exercises at the detention facility in question,43 so Boumediene might
not be limited to Guantánamo Bay and its unique territorial status.44
37

Kiik, supra note 12, at 1959.
Id. at 1949 & n.38 (quoting Stephen I. Vladeck, Rights Without Remedies: The Newfound National Security Exception to Bivens, A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. REP., July 2006, at 4–5) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Arar, 585 F.3d at 573–77 (describing the broad range of “special factors
counseling hesitation,” including executive prerogatives and the need to protect classified information,
that led it to prohibit the plaintiff’s Bivens action).
As a positive matter, as Professor Brown notes, “to designate the entire war on terror as a special
factor is perhaps a stretch beyond previously recognized contexts given that those contexts are both narrower and more specific,” Brown, supra note 10, at 894–95, and “it is error to suppose that every
case . . . which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance,” id. at 895 (quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, when the court defers to
a presidential maneuver, like the assertion of state-secrets privileges, rather than a congressional one, the
Executive effectively determines whether a Bivens right of action should exist. Kiik, supra note 12, at
1969.
39
See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 22, at 121–22, 133–36.
40
See id. at 121; see also Margulies, supra note 12, at 20203, 220 (proposing that courts view the
availability of a Bivens remedy as the “default position” and place the burden on officials to show that
they implemented proportional alternative methods when confronted with similar situations proximate in
time to the one at issue in the lawsuit).
41
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
42
Boumediene can be read to reject any per se rules against the application of constitutional protections to noncitizens abroad. Jules Lobel, Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution: The Case of
Maher Arar, 28 REV. LITIG. 479, 493 (2008). Others have argued more generally that the Supreme
Court’s recent habeas corpus jurisprudence points toward the extension of constitutional rights, and Bivens relief, to extraterritorial detainees. E.g., Brown, supra note 10, at 846–47.
43
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754.
44
Lobel, supra note 42, at 494 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 727). The Boumediene decision can
be read to reject broadly the circumscription of constitutional rights based on geography, an approach
that led to the “legal black hole[s]” that proved so tempting to the Bush Administration in establishing a
38
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Indeed, in April 2009, a district judge ruled that three aliens detained at
Bagram in Afghanistan were entitled to habeas review.45 Following Boumediene, the court examined the United States’ “objective degree of control” at the site of detention46 and found that a Status of Forces Agreement
and a lease afforded the U.S. government “near-total operational control.”47
The court acknowledged that the bases for its finding would apply to nearly
any U.S.-run military facility in the world.48 Although the D.C. Circuit later
reversed the holding,49 it did so not by invalidating the Boumediene “objective degree of control” test, but by reaching a different conclusion as to
whether the facts surrounding Bagram satisfied the test.50 The opinions,
therefore, may still foretell a Boumediene-inspired trend toward extending
constitutional rights to detainees abroad. This trend will allow courts to
consider whether Bivens rights of action should be available to vindicate
any newly extended rights. To date, courts and commentators have made
much ado about the availability of Bivens rights of action and the special
factors that might preclude them,51 but they have paid little attention to the
foreign detention scheme after September 11, 2001. See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION
FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 195–97 (2009).
Long before the GWOT, others suggested that constitutional restraints should attach to federal officials’ actions rather than to their locations. See, e.g., John A. Ragosta, Aliens Abroad: Principles for the
Application of Constitutional Limitations to Federal Action, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 287, 293–94
(1985) (“In applying the Constitution abroad . . . it is always a U.S. citizen—a government official—
who is being controlled by the Constitution. Since the Court’s decision in Reid v. Covert [354 U.S. 1
(1957)], it is clear that these officials are controlled, at home and abroad, by constitutional limitations.”
(footnote omitted)).
45
Al Maqaleh v. Gates (al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207–09 (2009), rev’d, al Maqaleh II,
605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Heeding Boumediene, the court analyzed:
(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the detainee; (3) the adequacy of the process
through which the status determination was made; (4) the nature of the site of apprehension; (5)
the nature of the site of detention; and (6) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner’s entitlement to the writ.
Id. at 215. The court also considered the “length of a petitioner’s detention without adequate review,”
which it thought more tacitly informed the Boumediene Court. Id. at 216.
46
Id. at 221.
47
Id. at 222. U.S. personnel may enter and exit Afghanistan without passports, and U.S. vehicles,
imports, and exports are exempt from taxation, regulation, and inspection. Id.
48
Id.
49
Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
50
Id. at 88. The court emphasized that “Afghanistan remains a theater of active military combat”
and listed facts contrary to any exclusive U.S. control. Id. It concluded that al Maqaleh I’s application
of the test would make habeas relief available to prisoners at any U.S. military facility in the world and
refused to adopt such a broad application of the Boumediene test. Id. at 95.
51
See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563–65 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3409 (2010); Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 529–30 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009);
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1019–25 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Brown, supra note 10; Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755
(2004); Margulies, supra note 12; Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 22; Stephen I. Vladeck, National
Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010); Vladeck, supra note 38; Kiik,
supra note 12.
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defense that stands to eviscerate any hard-fought victory in the availability
of Bivens rights of action: qualified immunity.
B. The Defense of Qualified Immunity
Most executive officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit,52 which
prevents fear of personal liability and costly litigation from impairing their
effectiveness.53 Qualified immunity exempts government officials from
personal liability where their actions are “reasonable in light of current
American law.”54 Thus, in order to be protected by qualified immunity, officials must be aware of fundamental constitutional rights and act accordingly.55 A government actor’s claim that he was “just following orders”
will not immunize him.56 While courts require awareness of the law, they
do not expect officials to anticipate new extensions of rights or changes in
the law “with a prescience that escapes even the most able scholars, lawyers, and judges.”57 As the Court recently explained, “Qualified immunity
gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken
judgments about open legal questions.”58 The qualified immunity tests of
the last four decades account for these understandings.
1. The Pre-Saucier Merits Bypass.—The judicial test for qualified
immunity has evolved significantly over the last forty-four years. What began in 1967 as a subjective test of the official’s “good faith” belief in the
constitutionality of his actions59 has evolved into a purely objective test.
Now, under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, qualified immunity protects officials
whose conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”60 This retrospective standard can be read to not require any adjudication of the
52

The President, judges, and prosecutors, when engaging in prosecutorial conduct, enjoy absolute
immunity from suits for money damages. Other government officials are protected by qualified immunity. See David Rudovsky, Saucier v. Katz: Qualified Immunity as a Doctrine of Dilution of Constitutional Rights, in WE DISSENT: TALKING BACK TO THE REHNQUIST COURT 172, 173 (Michael Avery ed.,
2009). The courts recognize an “interchangeability of immunity precedents between § 1983 suits . . .
and Bivens actions.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 654 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This
Comment, therefore, discusses qualified immunity precedent and scholarship from both types of suits.
53
JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 208, 210 (2006).
54
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 (majority opinion).
55
See id. at 649–50 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56
Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 788 (2006).
57
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 649–50 n.2. Some commentators, however, argue that Bivens claims
themselves demand too high a degree of foresight from officials. See Margulies, supra note 12, at 199
(“Graced with the omniscience of hindsight, courts and juries overestimate officials’ ability to correctly
decide whom to arrest, detain, or interrogate.”).
58
Al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011).
59
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
60
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified
Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 237–38 (2006).
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underlying constitutionality of the official’s conduct, implying that rights
adjudication is unnecessary in qualified immunity analyses.61
A few years after Harlow, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth
implied that courts were not required to reach the merits of the alleged constitutional violation before granting qualified immunity on the basis that the
right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of the offending conduct.62 Because of this implied discretion to avoid deciding the merits, in the years after Mitchell, courts often opted to forego the merits
decision. In 1989 and 1990, lower courts avoided the constitutional question in more than twenty-five percent of constitutional tort cases involving a
qualified immunity defense.63
In Siegert v. Gilley,64 the Supreme Court sought to slow the growing
trend of constitutional avoidance. As was common at the time, the lower
court in Siegert had skipped over the question of whether the plaintiff had
stated any cognizable constitutional claim.65 In overturning the court of appeals decision, the Supreme Court explained that “[a] necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a
plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional
right at all.”66 While pre-Siegert cases had given courts the choice of addressing or bypassing the constitutional question with a dose of skepticism
that such an inquiry need be undertaken, Siegert gave them this choice with
a light nudge towards adjudicating the constitutional merits.
The ten-year period after Siegert reveals the approach taken by lower
courts in qualified immunity analyses when the Supreme Court recommends, but does not mandate, merits-first sequencing. Despite the Siegert
Court’s tacit encouragement, the lower courts were reluctant to decide the
constitutional merits first, and seldom did so.67 Their reluctance continued
61

See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 874
(2005).
62
472 U.S. 511, 52728 (1985) (reasoning that a decision about the official’s qualified immunity
addresses a claim that is “conceptually distinct from the merits” and prohibits the plaintiff’s Bivens
claim from going forward); accord Chen, supra note 60, at 241.
63
Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 667, 670 (2009).
64
See 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
65
See Healy, supra note 61, at 876–77.
66
Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232.
67
See Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation
of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 411 (2009); Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of
Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz,
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 53, 70 (2008). But see Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical
Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 523, 531 (2010) (arguing that it is inaccurate to classify the pre-Saucier period as a phase of discretionary sequencing because of the lower courts’ significant confusion about their discretion at that
time).
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even after the Supreme Court, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, indicated
that a “better approach” would be to adjudicate the constitutional claims before reaching the “clearly established” prong of the test68 and, in Wilson v.
Layne, reiterated the benefits of deciding the constitutional question first.69
The circuit courts split on whether Siegert, Sacramento, and Wilson really
demanded merits-first analysis.70
2. Saucier and Merits-First Analysis.—In 2001, the Supreme Court
unambiguously settled the debate in the lower courts about whether they
had to address a claim’s constitutional merits before proceeding to the
“clearly established” inquiry. In Saucier v. Katz, the Court clarified no
fewer than five times that a court presented with a qualified immunity defense must consider the constitutional question first and the “clearly established” question second.71 Determining the existence or nonexistence of a
constitutional right first would aid the case-to-case development of the law72
and lead courts to define more specifically the constitutional rights at issue.73 If a court simply jumped to the “clearly established” inquiry, “[t]he
law might be deprived of this explanation.”74 After Saucier, lower courts’
use of the mandatory merits-first Saucier sequence jumped to nearly ninetynine percent.75
What is most important to recognize about mandatory Saucier sequencing is that it permits courts to find that a constitutional right exists,
but then to find that the government official is nonetheless entitled to quali68

523 U.S. 833, 841–42 n.5 (1998).
526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
70
Overall, the lower appellate courts still skipped the constitutional question in twenty-six percent
of qualified immunity decisions. Hughes, supra note 67, at 424. The district courts, at this time, bypassed the constitutional merits in thirteen percent of qualified immunity decisions. See Leong, supra
note 63, at 711.
71
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (“[T]he first inquiry must be whether a constitutional
right would have been violated on the facts alleged . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. (“[T]he requisites of a
qualified immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence.” (emphasis added)); id. at 201 (“A
court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: . . . do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” (emphasis added)); id. (“This must be the initial inquiry.” (emphasis added)); id. at 207 (“Our instruction
to . . . concentrate at the outset on the definition of the constitutional right and to determine whether, on
the facts alleged, a constitutional violation could be found is important.” (emphasis added)).
72
See id. at 201.
73
See id. at 207.
74
Id. at 201.
75
See Hughes, supra note 67, at 424; see also Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 67, at 538 (“[T]he
shift to mandatory sequencing corresponded to a decrease in the frequency with which appellate courts
skipped the substantive constitutional question.” (citing Hughes, supra note 67, at 418, 424)). In 2005,
appellate courts declined to resolve the constitutional merits of the plaintiff’s claim before proceeding to
qualified immunity in only two cases. Hughes, supra note 67, at 424. In 2006 and 2007, courts followed the mandatory Saucier sequence approximately ninety-five percent of the time. Leong, supra
note 63, at 711 tbls.3 & 4. The courts that still occasionally deviated from Saucier sequencing did not
articulate any clear basis for doing so. See id. at 682.
69
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fied immunity because the constitutional right was not clearly established at
the time the official is alleged to have violated it. In this way, a court may
formally recognize and announce a novel constitutional right without punishing an official who had no notice of such a right when he acted.
3. Pearson v. Callahan: Back to the Future?.—From 2001 to 2008,
the Supreme Court heard, but did not heed, critics of Saucier sequencing.76
In March 2008, however, upon granting review of a Tenth Circuit decision
regarding the “consent-once-removed” doctrine,77 the Supreme Court took
the unusual step of directing the parties to brief and argue whether the
Saucier decision should be overruled.78 On January 21, 2009, the Supreme
Court officially overruled Saucier and reinstated discretion to omit the constitutional rights inquiry from qualified immunity analyses.79
Importantly, the Court wholeheartedly agreed with the Saucier Court
that the merits-first sequence promotes constitutional development.80 It
proposed, however, that the articulation of constitutional rights need not rely on qualified immunity analyses in Bivens and § 1983 claims.81 Suits for
injunctive relief against government officials, suits against municipalities,
and motions to suppress evidence in criminal trials would provide alternative venues for constitutional elaboration82 because they all necessarily require plaintiffs to litigate the applicability and scope of a constitutional
right. The Court emphasized that, where a Bivens plaintiff’s claim is unlikely to arise in an alternative arena for constitutional development, the
two-part test would remain “especially valuable.”83
The Court’s confidence that the lower courts would exercise their discretion to undertake the constitutional rights inquiry based on its reminder
that the two-step process is “often appropriate” and sometimes “especially
valuable” betrays the Court’s short memory. Scholars have already pre76

See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 817–18 (2009) (citing Supreme Court concurrences and
dissents in which the opinion author expressed doubt, or outright disapproval, for a mandatory Saucier
sequence); see also supra Part IV.A. (discussing common criticisms of the Saucier approach).
77
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 814. The Tenth Circuit case addressed whether a member of a narcotics
task force had violated Callahan’s Fourth Amendment rights when he conducted a warrantless search of
Callahan’s property based on the fact that Callahan had given an informant permission to enter. See
Callahan v. Millard Cnty., 494 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct.
808 (2009).
78
Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008) (mem.).
79
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
80
Id. Also, in some circumstances a court may not be able to answer the “clearly established” question until it has identified the precise constitutional right involved. Id.
81
Id. at 821–22.
82
Id. Suits against municipalities could serve to develop constitutional law because municipal actors have no qualified immunity defense. Id. at 822. This Comment does not discuss suits against municipalities as possible alternatives to develop detainee rights because local and municipal governments
are not responsible for the GWOT detainees’ detention, treatment, or rendition, so these suits are not viable options for recovery.
83
Id. at 818.
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dicted a post-Pearson reversion to the qualified immunity jurisprudence of
the 1990s that necessitated the Saucier sequence in the first place.84 Lower
courts, they argue, will find skipping the constitutional question to be the
path of least resistance.85 This presents a nearly insurmountable obstacle for
GWOT plaintiffs seeking reparations through Bivens.86 Despite the history
of the qualified immunity analysis, the Pearson Court decided to rely heavily on the lower courts’ willingness to develop constitutional law by identifying claims involving constitutional questions that were unlikely to
develop through other types of suits and to apply the Saucier sequence in
those cases.87 As the next Part demonstrates, GWOT Bivens actions squarely fit within these criteria. Yet the lower courts have not consistently recognized the need for a two-step qualified immunity analysis, and scholars
and the Supreme Court have failed to engage in the examination of other
possible rights of action as applied to GWOT Bivens claims that would reveal the need for Saucier sequencing in these instances.
Indeed, in its recent Ashcroft v. al-Kidd (al-Kidd III) opinion—the first
GWOT Bivens decision after Pearson—the Supreme Court neither condemned nor applauded the Ninth Circuit’s decision to apply a merits-first
analysis.88 Although Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Camreta v. Greene,
handed down just five days before al-Kidd III, had reemphasized the general availability of alternative causes of action to elaborate constitutional issues,89 and although the Ninth Circuit’s al-Kidd II opinion had expressly
identified al-Kidd’s Bivens claim as one for which Saucier sequencing re84

See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 67, at 404 (“Either abandoning or relaxing Wilson-Saucier would
lead to significant constitutional stagnation.”). But see Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 67, at 527 (arguing that post-Pearson lower court behavior cannot be predicted based on pre-Saucier trends because
Pearson conferred sequencing discretion without ambiguity).
85
See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 115, 131 (“Saucier’s benefits are forward-looking and systemic, while its costs are felt here and
now. Busy trial judges who see a short route to decision on qualified immunity will often be unwilling
to come to grips with the merits, even though the failure to do so may be costly in the long run.”).
86
But cf. Reinert, supra note 13, at 843 (reporting, without respect to whether cases were in or out
of the GWOT context, that, in his sample, qualified immunity accounted for fewer dismissals than merits decisions, frivolity, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies). Professor Reinert noted that this
surprising finding that qualified immunity played only a minor role in the overall dismissal rate for Bivens claims could reflect “most troublingly . . . that the prospect of qualified immunity deters lawyers
from accepting the most difficult Bivens cases, thus operating as an unseen thumb on the scale in favor
of maintaining the legal status quo.” Id. at 844.
87
Professor Jeffries has more broadly and perhaps more explicitly asserted that courts must differentiate their qualified immunity analyses based on the dependence of the right at hand on suits for money damages. See Jeffries, supra note 85, at 13236.
88
Al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). The Court primarily reiterated the principles it developed in
Pearson: that lower courts have discretion regarding a one- versus two-step approach to qualified immunity analysis and that they should “think carefully before expending ‘scarce judicial resources’ to resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will ‘have no effect
on the outcome of the case.’” Id. at 2080 (quoting Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818).
89
See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2043–44 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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mained “especially valuable,”90 the Supreme Court’s opinion did not discuss
those alternatives in the GWOT Bivens context. Had the Court undertaken
this inquiry, it likely would have identified GWOT Bivens actions as a category of qualified immunity litigation for which the Saucier sequence remains essential.
II. WHY PEARSON’S RELIANCE ON NON-BIVENS SUITS IS MISPLACED FOR
GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR DETAINEES
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S. military, intelligence, and
law enforcement officials captured and detained thousands of U.S. citizens
and alien “enemy combatants.” Detained U.S. citizens at times were
housed in military brigs91 and prisons.92 Aliens who were already on U.S.
soil, whether legally or illegally, often were detained domestically until
they were cleared for deportation.93 Aliens captured abroad were held at
Bagram, Abu Ghraib, and other secret “black sites.”94 Some of them found
themselves at Guantánamo Bay. Many detainees have been released or,
more recently, charged with crimes for which they will be tried by military
commissions or Article III courts.95 The number of detainees at Guantánamo Bay has dwindled to fewer than two hundred96 as President Obama has
continued efforts initiated by President Bush to arrange for the transfer of
detainees to other countries.
Closing Guantánamo, however, will not end the detention of citizens
and aliens in the United States and abroad in connection with the GWOT.
In 2008, the detainee population in Iraq was approximately 26,000, much
larger than that of Guantánamo.97 Detainees also remain at other foreign
detention sites.98 For a long time, detention will be part of U.S. efforts to
neutralize terrorist threats to the United States.99 The questions become the
following: What kind of detention program may the President implement to
90

Al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 964 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074.
See, e.g., Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
92
See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2079.
93
See, e.g., El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 255 (D. Conn. 2008).
94
See generally James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on Terror, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 498 n.2 (2006) (collecting news articles and reports of foreign “black
sites”).
95
See infra note 141.
96
BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE
GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 4 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf.
97
WITTES, supra note †, at 160.
98
See id.
99
See id. at 153 (“[T]he United States will end up holding some number of Al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters outside of the criminal justice system for some time to come—and we hope to capture more. So
if the military closes the detention operation at Guantánamo, it will simply have to re-create it somewhere else.”).
91
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accomplish these disablement and intelligence-gathering goals? In the
wake of the Guantánamo Bay detentions, which have sparked ire in the
United States and the international community, what is constitutionally appropriate?
The answer to these questions is most likely to come from Bivens actions brought by detainees. The qualified immunity defense to these claims,
when decided based on a Saucier merits-first process, serves an important
notice-giving function without unfairly penalizing officials for failing to
predict the future of constitutional law. Forced to address the underlying
constitutional right that the plaintiff claims was violated, a court must directly determine principles, and possibly limitations, that will guide executive officials in future conduct. If the court finds that the Constitution does
in fact provide an individual with a right and then clarifies this constitutional right, the President and his officials will know to avoid conduct that
would violate that right. In this way, the Executive Branch can escape future litigation, public outcry, and foreign relations debacles. Where the
court denies the existence of the asserted constitutional right or finds that it
was not violated, the President and his officials learn that they need not hesitate when confronted with similar circumstances in the future.
Unfortunately for both the Executive Branch and GWOT victims,
Pearson stands to stanch any flow of constitutional guidance that would
come out of two-step qualified immunity analyses. The Pearson Court did
not consider that the constitutional rights of GWOT victims fit into the dangerous category of being unlikely to arise in suits in which qualified immunity defenses are not available.100 And the Court failed to address this
danger even in the GWOT Bivens case that it decided this past Term.101
This Part demonstrates why the alternative suits that the Pearson Court
entrusted to continue the march of constitutional law development are unlikely mechanisms for the adjudication of constitutional issues underlying
executive detention schemes in the GWOT.
A. Suits for Injunctive or Declaratory Relief
In assuaging concerns that one-step qualified immunity analyses would
lead to constitutional stagnation, the Pearson Court pointed to motions for
injunctive and declaratory relief as alternative legal procedures to facilitate
the elaboration of constitutional rules.102 While these legal procedures generally can serve that purpose, they are unlikely to do so for GWOT victims.

100

Indeed, the Pearson Court had no reason to recognize the impact of its ruling on GWOT detainee cases since its facts did not implicate those types of plaintiffs or their Bivens claims.
101
See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
102
Although the Pearson Court did not explicitly mention declaratory judgments, the logic applying
to suits for injunctive relief applies to declaratory judgments as well. See infra notes 12425.
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Injunctions come in many forms.103 As the Pearson Court recognized,
a motion for a preliminary injunction can lead the deciding court to adjudicate constitutional rights questions.104 The first element a plaintiff must
show on a motion for a preliminary injunction is a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits.105 To make this determination, a court evaluates
whether the conduct the plaintiff seeks to enjoin would constitute a violation of her rights. Herein lies the reason for the Pearson Court’s assurance
that, absent constitutional development in civil rights damages actions, orders for and against injunctions will still advance constitutional elaboration.
But this assurance rings hollow in the GWOT detainee context.106
GWOT detainees have filed preliminary injunctions seeking to enjoin
certain confinement conditions,107 torture,108 military commission proceedings,109 transfer to countries where they may be tortured or prosecuted,110
and even force-feeding during a hunger strike.111 But, courts have granted
very few injunctions that implicate constitutional rights.112 When they have,
103

See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7 (1978) (describing preventive, reparative,
and structural injunctions, as well as interlocutory versus final injunctions, and mandatory versus prohibitory injunctions).
104
See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821–22 (2009).
105
O.K. v. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111 (D.D.C. 2005). In addition, plaintiffs must show that
they will suffer irreparable harm if the anticipated conduct continues, that other parties will not be
harmed by the injunction, and that public interests support the injunction. Id. Courts must balance the
plaintiff’s arguments as to each of the four elements. Id.
Similarly, a court may grant a motion for a permanent injunction only when it determines that the
plaintiff has suffered an irreparable injury, that other legal remedies are inadequate to compensate for
that injury, that the balance between the hardships on the plaintiff and those on the defendant warrants
an equitable remedy, and that a permanent injunction will not disserve public interests. Ebay Inc. v.
Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). A plaintiff seeking an injunction to protect her constitutional rights would have to demonstrate a constitutional injury in the first prong of the test.
106
Some of the problems with injunctions as mechanisms for constitutional elaboration are not limited to the GWOT context. As Professor Jeffries notes, most victims of constitutional torts have no
notice that a constitutional violation is going to occur, and many would encounter standing limitations.
Jeffries, supra note 85, at 13233.
107
See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 570 F. Supp. 2d 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2008); Paracha
v. Bush, 374 F. Supp. 2d 118, 119 (D.D.C. 2005).
108
See O.K., 377 F. Supp. 2d at 103.
109
See, e.g., Al Sharbi v. Bush, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2006); Hicks v. Bush, 397 F. Supp. 2d
36, 37 (D.D.C. 2005).
110
See, e.g., Belbacha v. Bush, 520 F.3d 452, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Sliti v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d
116, 117 (D.D.C. 2005). Detainees have also demanded advance notice of such transfers. See, e.g.,
Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010); Mammar
v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 77, 78 (D.D.C. 2005); O.K., 377 F. Supp. 2d at 111; Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F.
Supp. 2d 188, 189 (D.D.C. 2005).
111
See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 596 F. Supp. 2d 111, 114 (D.D.C. 2009).
112
Aside from the barrage of motions for injunctions compelling notice before transfer out of Guantánamo, detainees have succeeded on motions for injunctions in only four instances, and only two of the
injunctions asserted any judicial opinion as to the detainee’s rights. See Adem v. Bush, 425 F. Supp. 2d
7, 8 (D.D.C. 2006) (compelling compliance with a protective order requiring that the detainee have
access to counsel); Al-Joudi v. Bush, 406 F. Supp. 2d 13, 23 (D.D.C. 2005) (compelling the detainee’s
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they have avoided the constitutional underpinnings, often due to the separation-of-powers implications of a judicial order restraining military or national security activities. In 2005, a Guantánamo Bay detainee sought a
preliminary injunction against his interrogation, torture, and other cruel and
degrading treatment.113 The court denied the detainee any injunction against
interrogation, finding no law for the “extraordinary notion” that a court
could prohibit federal executive officers from interrogating captives from
live military hostilities,114 especially in light of military officials’ assertions
that barring these interrogations could threaten national security.115 While
the detainee’s motion for an injunction against torture received more scrutiny,116 the court still avoided deciding whether the detainee had any constitutional right to be free from torture and where the Constitution would draw
the line between acceptable interrogation and impermissible torture in this
situation.117 The court held that such allegations still did not warrant the
“exceptional remedy of a preliminary injunction” against the U.S. military
in this setting.118 Although the court could conceive of facts sufficiently extreme to warrant a determination of whether officials had violated whatever
Fifth Amendment due process rights a detainee may have, these allegations
were not enough.119 Unless the petitioner convincingly alleged conditions
so severe as to constitute an imminent threat to his health, “the Court
[would] not insert itself into the day-to-day operations of Guantánamo.”120
The court was unwilling to exert prospective control over the military
operations of executive officers during wartime.121 This is, undoubtedly, a
access to counsel during a hunger strike). The other two injunctions merely stayed the detainees’ military commissions while the Supreme Court was deciding whether those commissions were lawful in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). See Al Sharbi, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 1–2; Hicks, 397 F. Supp.
2d at 44–45.
In the notice-of-transfer context, detainees have asserted two primary bases for requiring notice before being transferred from Guantánamo Bay to some other nation: (1) that such transfers would “unlawfully circumvent review of [their] pending habeas petitions” and (2) that such transfer, and the torture
that allegedly would follow, would violate their rights under international conventions, namely the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil Rights. See
Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantánamo: The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L.
REV. 657, 667–69 (2006). As of 2006, D.C. district judges had ruled in favor of the detainees on noticeof-transfer injunctions twenty-seven out of thirty-four times, thus requiring the government to give at
least thirty days notice before transferring a detainee out of Guantánamo Bay. Id. at 668.
113
O.K., 377 F. Supp. 2d at 111.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 112.
116
Id. The detainee’s torture allegations included short-shackling and being used as a “human
mop” to soak up urine and pine solvent. Id.
117
Id. at 113.
118
Id. at 112.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 114.
121
See id. (“This Court is not equipped or authorized to assume the broader roles of a congressional
oversight committee or a superintendent of the operations of a military base.”).
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legitimate concern given the nature of injunctive relief. If an official violates the terms of an injunction, the issuing judge may hold the official in
contempt, which may include a fine or imprisonment, until the official
complies with the injunction.122 Imprisonment could completely incapacitate executive officials during wartime, a restriction that likely would prevent them from protecting national security interests. The consequences of
an injunction on government operations, therefore, are far greater than an
obligation to pay damages for bygone conduct after wartime exigencies
have cooled.123
This same argument against relying on injunctions to develop the constitutional rights of GWOT victims applies to motions for declaratory relief.
A declaratory judgment pronounces the legality (sometimes the constitutionality) of the defendant’s anticipated conduct.124 While conduct not in conformity with a declaratory judgment does not lead directly to penalties, the
official’s nonadherence entitles the plaintiff to an injunction to enforce the
declaratory judgment, thereby activating the same potential conductrestricting penalties for noncompliance that exist with an injunction.125
In O.K. v. Bush,126 the court itself seemed skeptical about the value of
injunctive relief to remedy harms caused by torture, mistreatment, and unjustified detention. The petitioner’s treatment at Guantánamo had been at
its worst eighteen months earlier, and the petitioner had not offered any
evidence that it would rise to that level again.127 Without saying so, the
court seemed to consider the petitioner’s claims effectively moot. Protection for the O.K. detainee going forward seemed an inappropriate remedy
for the past harms.128 That said, the court did not believe that federal courts
should condone the petitioner’s mistreatment.129 Clearly, in this type of
scenario, damages for past violations are preferable to an injunction preventing future conduct that the Executive Branch claims will not occur.
Injunctions and declaratory judgments are also ineffective remedies for
wartime detainees because of the Executive Branch’s historical and continuing ability to sidestep impending judicial decisions. Since injunctions
and declaratory judgments only apply to future actions, an executive official
seeking to evade a constitutional ruling can merely shift or cease his chal122

MICHAEL L. WELLS & THOMAS A. EATON, CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES: A REFERENCE GUIDE
186 (2002).
123
See id. at 188 (“The consequences of granting prospective relief may be far greater than the simple obligation to pay damages, as government may have to change its operations in important ways.”).
124
See Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 565, 573 n.27 (1995) (collecting cases adjudicating constitutional rights through motions for declaratory relief).
125
See WELLS & EATON, supra note 122, at 186.
126
377 F. Supp. 2d 102.
127
Id. at 112–14.
128
See id. at 114.
129
See id.
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
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lenged behavior. For example, when the Supreme Court undertook constitutional review of the Japanese internments during World War II in Korematsu v. United States,130 President Roosevelt nearly mooted the issue the
day before the Supreme Court issued its opinion by announcing the closure
of the camps.131
Executive avoidance has become a familiar phenomenon in the GWOT
in two contexts: (1) the Executive Branch’s decision to house GWOT detainees at offshore sites to evade judicial review and (2) the Executive
Branch’s last-minute maneuvering to evade pending judicial decisions
about the legality of certain detention and treatment policies.132 When U.S.
courts started reviewing executive detentions, the Executive Branch began
mooting issues before the courts could decide them. A few examples suffice to demonstrate the phenomenon. The unexpected transfer of detainee
Jose Padilla out of military custody mooted an appeal to the Supreme
Court133 from the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Padilla v. Hanft holding that
he was lawfully detained under the President’s congressionally authorized
Authorization for Use of Military Force powers.134 When an American citizen who had been arrested, detained, and interrogated in Saudi Arabia and
later flown back to the United States to await trial135 filed a habeas corpus
petition, and a court ordered discovery into U.S. officials’ role in his foreign
detention, the government mooted the petition and the order by transferring
him back stateside and indicting him on criminal charges.136 In doing so,
the government may have avoided a ruling extending rights to detainees
held abroad or transferred abroad by the United States.

130

323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long War, the Federal Courts, and the Necessity/Legality Paradox,
43 U. RICH. L. REV. 893, 917–18 (2009) (book review).
132
The choice to call these U.S. efforts a “war” may have constituted another form of executive
avoidance. By calling the U.S. response “war,” President Bush ensured that the most recent law regarding alien detention rights was Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), a World War II case that, at
more than fifty years old, was woefully out of date in terms of available technologies, cultural beliefs,
and international conceptions of human rights. Cf. RAUSTIALA, supra note 44, at 198–200 (“The war
against Al Qaeda certainly differed from prior wars . . . .”). Otherwise, more recent cases about the detention of Haitians at Guantánamo Bay might have constrained military activities there. See id. at 199
200. For examples of executive-avoidance maneuvers in the GWOT, see Joseph Landau, Muscular
Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, 674 n.70
(2009).
133
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1038 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
134
Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). When the Government first petitioned to transfer
Padilla to a criminal court and vacate the Fourth Circuit’s decision, Padilla was lawfully detained—
although his petition for certiorari on the question was then pending before the Supreme Court. The
Fourth Circuit perceived the transfer as an avoidance maneuver and denied the transfer and vacatur on
that very basis. See id.
135
United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 221–25 (4th Cir. 2008).
136
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Problem of Jurisdictional Non-precedent, 44 TULSA L. REV. 587, 611
(2009).
131
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The government’s evasion of judicial review of its detention programs
is most evident in its recent effort to evacuate Guantánamo Bay in the wake
of extensions of constitutional habeas corpus rights there and consequent
judicial inquiries into the evidence used to justify detentions. Between
2002 and 2008, the U.S. government released or transferred more than four
hundred Guantánamo Bay detainees either because they no longer posed
threats or because other countries were willing to accept them.137 In the
year after the Supreme Court’s Rasul v. Bush decision in 2004, which held
that the D.C. courts could entertain detainees’ habeas corpus petitions, custodial transfers increased while outright releases decreased.138 Since then,
the U.S. government has further increased the pace at which it transfers
Guantánamo detainees.139 Given the increasing number of opportunities for
judicial review in the post-Boumediene realm, this transfer program can be
viewed as another executive avoidance measure.140 Executive avoidance in
the GWOT detention context demonstrates the nonviability of motions for
injunctions and declaratory relief as venues for constitutional development.
B. Motions to Suppress in Criminal Prosecutions
Contrary to the Pearson Court’s assurances, motions to suppress evidence at criminal trials will not prevent constitutional stagnation of GWOT
victims’ rights. Constitutional law develops whenever a criminal defendant
argues that evidence offered against him was obtained unconstitutionally,
for example in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures or his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. However, many GWOT suspects do not have the
opportunity to face criminal prosecutions in Article III courts, where these
rights are well established.141
137

Owen Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 643, 644 (2008).
Chesney, supra note 112, at 660–65. There were seventeen custodial transfers between January
2002 and June 2004, as compared to the fifty-one that occurred between July 2004 and July 2005. Id.
139
In the three-and-a-half years covered by Professor Chesney’s review (January 2002 to July
2005), there were sixty-eight custodial transfers. Id. Between January 2007 and March 2010, the U.S.
government transferred approximately 210 Guantánamo detainees to other countries. See The Guantánamo Docket—Timeline, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/timeline (last visited
Aug. 21, 2011) (providing a chronological list of transfers and how many detainees were transferred on
each occasion).
140
Increased pressure from the international community and President Obama’s presidential campaign promises to close Guantánamo undoubtedly also have motivated the rush to close Guantánamo.
See Senator Barack Obama, The War We Need to Win, Address at the Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for
Scholars
(Aug.
1,
2006),
available
at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
barackobamawilsoncenter.htm.
141
For two such criminal prosecutions, see United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008),
and United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004).
In November 2009, President Obama announced that five Guantánamo detainees would face criminal prosecution in New York City. Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1. Based on President Obama’s remarks, it
138
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The trial records and facts of some of the GWOT’s most notorious trials are instructive with respect to the extent of rights-protective trial procedures that alleged terrorists can expect to be guaranteed.142 In United States
v. Abu Ali, the defendant claimed the court should apply U.S. standards of
admissibility to his statements made during questioning by foreign officials
because that interrogation was conducted as part of a “joint venture” with
the United States.143 Although the United States had submitted questions to
the Saudi Mabahith to be asked during its interrogation, watched the interrogation through a one-way mirror, and consulted with the Saudi Mabahith
at the end of the interview, the district court construed “joint venture” nar-

appeared that detainees’ eligibility for criminal prosecution would be based precisely on the likelihood
that they would not present difficult evidentiary questions that might give rise to rulings awarding the
detainees constitutional rights. See Editorial, Terror on the Docket, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 2009, at 18;
Phil Bronstein, Obama & Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: If One Branch Is Good, Two Must Be Better?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2009, 05:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/phil-bronstein/obamakhalid-sheikh-moham_b_364503.html. The Obama Administration later withdrew its plans for “terror
trials” in New York City. Scott Shane & Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Drops Plan for a 9/11 Trial in New
York City, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A1. As of April 2011, the Administration had offered no indication that its criteria for selecting cases for Article III criminal trials would change if trials were again
slated to proceed. See, e.g., William J. Bennett & Seth Leibsohn, Obama Administration Learns Lesson
on Terrorism Trials, CNN OPINION (Apr. 6, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-04-06/opinion/bennett.
liebsohn.trials_1_civilian-courts-obama-administration-military-commission?_s=PM:OPINION (reporting that the Obama Administration had decided to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in a military tribunal
and offering potential reasons for the decision, including the likelihood that “[u]sing civilian courts presented all sorts of evidentiary issues, Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues” (quoting lawyers Lee Casey
and David Rivkin)).
Recently, the National Security Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) unsealed records of 403
criminal prosecutions under various terror-related statutes. NAT’L SEC. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
STATISTICS ON UNSEALED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND TERRORISM-RELATED CONVICTIONS,
available at http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/March-26-2010-NSDFinal-Statistics.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2011). According to the DOJ, the prosecutions all involve offenses related to international terrorism. Id. at intro. However, only 150 of the defendants were prosecuted for Category I offenses, which involve actions more commonly associated with the term
“terrorism”: acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens abroad, use of weapons of mass destruction, provision
of material support to terrorist organizations overseas, bombings, and receipt of military-style training
from terrorist organizations. Id. The majority of the convictions relate to Category II offenses, which
involve “fraud, immigration, firearms, drugs, false statements, perjury, and obstruction of justice, as well
as general conspiracy charges under 18 U.S.C. § 371.” Id. Because of the secrecy of these trials to date,
it is impossible to know the extent of rights-protective trial procedures afforded the defendants.
142
528 F.3d 210, 227–30 (4th Cir. 2008).
143
Id. at 228–29. The court said:
The “joint venture” doctrine provides that “statements elicited during overseas interrogation by
foreign police in the absence of Miranda warnings must be suppressed whenever United States law
enforcement agents actively participate in questioning conducted by foreign authorities.” . . .
[The] general rule [is that] mere presence at an interrogation does not constitute the “active” or
“substantial” participation necessary for a “joint venture,” but coordination and direction of an investigation or interrogation does.
Id. (quoting United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145 (2d Cir. 2003)) (citations omitted).
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rowly and refused to suppress the evidence garnered from the interrogations.144
The uncertainty of trials, coupled with the possibility that terrorism trials in Article III courts may not fully safeguard rights-protective procedures, means that motions to suppress evidence are insufficiently reliable
for the development of detainees’ constitutional rights. Moreover, the exclusionary rule has never been an avenue for vindicating certain constitutional claims, such as claims that police officers used excessive force.145
But while terror suspects as a group have had relatively few opportunities to
test trial mechanisms for rights development, they have been able to pursue
release through habeas corpus.
C. Habeas Corpus
As with the other would-be alternative legal procedures, habeas corpus
hearings are unlikely to be effective fora for the judicial articulation of
GWOT victims’ constitutional rights.146 Unlike the other causes of action
discussed above, however, habeas corpus is not without value to the development of restraints on executive detention power in the GWOT context.
Habeas corpus claims are best viewed as valuable but limited corollaries to
GWOT Bivens actions, ones that develop law applicable to earlier detention
actions rather than constitutional torts. While a writ of habeas corpus can
impose restraints on executive power,147 thereby imposing some constitutional limits and arguably developing some constitutional rules, it is not designed to delineate the contours of individual constitutional rights.
Even more importantly, those who are not detained at the time of their
challenges have no habeas right of action at all. Indeed, as with motions for
144

United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 382 (E.D. Va. 2005).
See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 85, at 135–36 (“Even within the doctrinal ambit of the Fourth
Amendment, for example, there are constitutional violations for which exclusion of evidence is irrelevant. They include what is arguably the greatest challenge in all the law of constitutional remedies—
inhibiting the abusive and excessive use of force by law enforcement. Although such wrongs are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, illegal seizure is not the problem, and exclusion of evidence not a
remedy. Under current law, the most (nearly) plausible redress for excessive force is the award of money damages.” (footnote omitted)).
146
While the Pearson Court did not expressly reference habeas corpus petitions as proceedings that
can advance constitutional law, their prevalence in GWOT detainee litigation to date calls for an explanation as to why those suits will not advance individual rights. Indeed, three commentators have suggested that the D.C. district courts’ numerous habeas corpus decisions constitute a form of “lawmaking”
that could develop some detainee rights. See WITTES ET AL., supra note 96.
147
See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 2029 (2009) (explaining that
habeas was designed to allow the Judiciary to “monitor” the other branches); id. at 2050 (describing the
GWOT habeas challenges as an “opportunity to announce new legal limits on the President”); cf.
WITTES, supra note †, at 122 (“[T]he effect of habeas so far has been salutary: sustained pressure on the
administration to move toward a fairer and more accountable system.”); Margulies, supra note 12, at
208–09, 224, 247 (opining that habeas cannot supplant a Bivens remedy but rather must be used in tandem with damages actions in order to address both executive myopia ex ante and hindsight bias ex post).
145
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injunctive relief, all an executive official needs to do to eliminate the value
of a habeas corpus claim is to release that particular detainee.
When the Pearson Court asserted that the development of constitutional rights is not dependent on actions for which qualified immunity is a defense, it nonetheless recognized that some questions do not often arise
outside of such cases. For those constitutional questions, Pearson urged the
continued application of Saucier sequencing.148 Motions for injunctions or
declaratory judgment and motions to suppress evidence in criminal trials
will not guard against constitutional stagnation in the context of GWOT issues. Habeas corpus petitions are likewise unavailing for the majority of
GWOT plaintiffs and for individual rights-development even though habeas
corpus does provide an essential complementary cause of action for those
presently detained and for purposes of delimiting preliminary executive detention powers. These alternative avenues for constitutional articulation are
unlikely to provide the benefit of notice to the Executive Branch, the benefits of compensation and personal vindication to injured detainees, or the
benefits of rights-development and rights-clarification to future detainees.
It is becoming increasingly clear that Bivens actions likely will be GWOT
victims’149 only avenue for litigation of these questions and for constitutional rights development and reparations.150 Unless a merits-first qualified
immunity analysis is applied to detainees’ Bivens claims, future GWOT victims’ rights will be almost as unclear as the rights of the first detainees to
arrive at Guantánamo Bay were.151
III. GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR BIVENS ACTIONS AFTER PEARSON: A VIEW
OF THINGS TO COME
In Pearson, the Court was careful to say that it had not eliminated the
opportunity for courts to address the merits of the constitutional violations
alleged by a civil rights plaintiff seeking damages. To the contrary, the
148

See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
GWOT detainees are not the only class of plaintiffs for whom the sole realistic cause of action is
one for monetary damages. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 85, 135–36; Leong, supra note 63, 668–69;
Rudovsky, supra note 52, at 172.
150
Cf. Vladeck, supra note 51, at 258 (discussing the GWOT Bivens actions and explaining that “so
long as Bivens remains on the books, it seems uniquely suited to provide a remedy in those cases in
which no other legal or political remedy is feasible”). Although compensation remedies may be all that
is left, they need not be viewed as leftovers. The Executive Branch may at times prefer paying compensatory damages in civil actions rather than foregoing mass detentions that confer significant security advantages or meet security necessities. See Kontorovich, supra note 51, at 797–98.
While some commentators have correctly pointed out that “[i]n individual cases, rulings about seemingly mundane procedural issues . . . have accelerated the release of . . . detainees who were held at
Guantánamo Bay,” see Landau, supra note 132, at 664, even “muscular” procedural rulings cannot replace constitutional pronouncements and will not serve the law-updating function that is so desperately
needed in this context. See infra Part IV.B; see also Landau, supra note 132, at 673 (“[P]rocedural decisions often create uncertainty in the law and delay final resolutions.”).
151
See WITTES, supra note †, at 153.
149
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two-step test will be “especially valuable” when alternate fora for the plaintiff’s claims are unlikely to be available or are unlikely to develop the constitutional law on the subject of the plaintiff’s claim. As demonstrated in
Part II, suits by GWOT detainees fit squarely within the class of claims
about which the Pearson Court was concerned. Most courts that have ruled
on qualified immunity defenses in detainees’ Bivens actions since Pearson,
including the Supreme Court, seem not to have recognized this.
Much like the pre-Saucier years, the two years since Pearson have
demonstrated that different circuits apply different standards to their decisions about when to take on the constitutional question in qualified immunity decisions. As U.S. military and defense entities continue to detain
suspected al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, the courts’ conflicting protocols
for addressing qualified immunity prevent the clarification of the rights of
these detainees to the detriment of both the detainees and executive officials. Detainees, and their attorneys, can only wonder about their rights.
Executive officials learn nothing about the constitutionality of their detention policies that can guide their ongoing decisionmaking.
Moreover, if the lower courts fail to address the merits of detainees’
Bivens claims as part of qualified immunity analyses, they indefinitely
postpone any constitutional clarification. The more circuits that bypass the
constitutional merits in qualified immunity analyses, the less robust the
body of lower court law available to the Supreme Court. In the absence of
percolation of novel detainee rights questions in the lower courts, the Supreme Court is unlikely to grant certiorari and issue a disposition that would
inform detainees and executive officials.152
In 2009, two circuits considered qualified immunity in GWOT detainees’ Bivens actions. Courts in the Ninth Circuit decided al-Kidd v. Ashcroft153 and Padilla v. Yoo.154 On the other coast, the D.C. Circuit ruled on
Rasul v. Myers,155 which the Supreme Court had remanded for consideration
in light of Boumediene.156 The discrepant results suggest that the essential
percolation of the constitutional issues underlying detainees’ Bivens actions
is unlikely to occur without further guidance.157
152

See Michael S. Catlett, Note, Clearly Not Established: Decisional Law and the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1051 (2005). See generally Todd J. Tiberi, Comment, Supreme Court Denials of Certiorari in Conflicts Cases: Percolation or Procrastination?, 54 U. PITT. L.
REV. 861 (1993) (describing percolation and discussing views on its effectiveness).
153
Al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
154
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
155
Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
156
Rasul I, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) (mem.).
157
Some scholars have noted the lower courts’ different approaches to the Bivens question rather
than to the qualified immunity question. See Margulies, supra note 12, at 237 (calling the difference
between the courts’ resolutions of Arar and Iqbal and the courts’ resolutions of al-Kidd and Padilla a
battle between “categorical deference” and “intervention”); Vladeck, supra note 51, at 268–78 (comparing the courts’ approaches to the Bivens right of action in these and other GWOT cases).
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A. A Return to Avoidance: Rasul v. Myers
The D.C. Circuit’s one-step approach to qualified immunity analysis in
Rasul v. Myers158 signals a return to familiar pre-Saucier constitutional
avoidance and all but guarantees the continued uncertainty of detainee
rights. In 2004, four British citizens filed a complaint alleging that they
were tortured after being captured in Afghanistan and sent to Guantánamo
Bay.159 They claimed they were held for two years without being charged
before they were released to return to their homes in the United Kingdom.160
The Rasul plaintiffs claimed their detention and mistreatment, which they
said amounted to torture, infringed their Fifth Amendment rights to liberty
and due process and their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment.161 They claimed that then-Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and his senior officials conceived their detention and
treatment as part of a “deliberate and foreseeable” plan.162
Despite the Rasul plaintiffs’ grisly allegations, the D.C. district court
granted Rumsfeld’s motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.163
Since the issue of the constitutional rights of Guantánamo detainees was
pending in the court of appeals, the court reserved its ruling on the thenmandatory merits prong of the Saucier test.164 It skipped to the “clearly established” second prong and held that any constitutional rights the Rasul
plaintiffs may have had were not clearly established at the time of the
Rumsfeld defendants’ conduct.165 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district
court’s qualified immunity ruling, finding against the plaintiffs on the constitutional merits and holding in the alternative that even if the plaintiffs had
rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, those rights were not clearly
established.166 When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it took the unusual path of vacating the D.C. Circuit’s judgment and remanding the case
for consideration in light of Boumediene.167

158

Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527.
Complaint ¶¶ 2–6, Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 04-1864), aff’d
sub nom. Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I), 512 F.3d at 644, vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) (mem.). The detainees claimed they were hit with rifle butts, punched, kicked, short-shackled, threatened with unmuzzled
dogs, forced to strip naked, subjected to cavity searches, exposed to extreme temperatures, kept in dirty
cages, denied medical care, and deprived of adequate food and sleep. Id. ¶ 6.
160
Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
161
Id. ¶ 7. The Rasul plaintiffs also claimed that their detention and mistreatment (torture) clearly
violated U.S. statutes, the Geneva Conventions, and international norms against torture and other cruel
or degrading treatment. Id. This Comment discusses only the Rasul plaintiffs’ Bivens claims.
162
Id. ¶¶ 8–12 (listing reports and memoranda allegedly formalizing and authorizing the practices).
163
Rasul, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 40–44.
164
Id. at 40–41.
165
Id. at 41–44.
166
Rasul I, 512 F.3d 644, 665–67 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) (mem.).
167
129 S. Ct. at 763.
159
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Arguably, Boumediene was a liberal move by a Court not willing to
permit the Executive Branch to make Guantánamo a “legal black hole”
where military and intelligence officers would be unchecked.168 This remand, then, may signal to lower courts that they should not be reluctant to
extend additional constitutional protections to the Guantánamo detainees.169
Whatever the Court’s hopes, when it issued its Pearson decision one month
after it remanded Rasul I, it ensured that the D.C. Circuit’s second look at
Rumsfeld’s qualified immunity defense need not involve any constitutional
inquiry at all.170 On remand the D.C. Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Boumediene required it to engage in a “multi-factor, ‘functional’
test to determine whether aliens in their predicament can invoke constitutional rights.”171 Rather, extolling the virtues of judicial restraint and expediency, the Court opted for a one-pronged qualified immunity analysis and
rested its decision to affirm Rasul I on its finding that any existing rights
were not clearly established.172
B. Judicial Awareness: Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft and Padilla v. Yoo
Since September 11, 2001, the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have
issued conflicting opinions more than once. For example, in March 2003,
the D.C. Circuit held that the writ of habeas corpus was not available to
aliens detained at Guantánamo Bay.173 In December 2003, the Ninth Circuit
expressed its opposite opinion that Guantánamo Bay was an American territory for habeas corpus purposes and that “enemy combatants” detained
there could petition for habeas relief.174 The Ninth Circuit historically has
been “reliably liberal” on constitutional rights jurisprudence.175 It is therefore unsurprising that, given the option by Pearson between avoiding and
addressing a constitutional question, Ninth Circuit courts have been eager to
engage. In doing so, they have recognized the damages-or-nothing posture
GWOT Bivens actions present.

168

See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
See Vladeck, supra note 136, at 589 n.17. One could argue instead that remanding “in light of
Boumediene” was meant to focus the circuit court’s attention on the newness of constitutional rights for
Guantánamo detainees, which would suggest such rights were not clearly established.
170
See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
171
See Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
172
See id. at 529–30. The court held, in the alternative, that “special factors counseling hesitation”
would preclude the Bivens claim from moving forward even if qualified immunity was no defense. Id.
at 532 n.5. Many have criticized the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on Rasul II. See, e.g., Editorial, Yes, It Was Torture, and Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at A20.
173
See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
174
See Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1289–94 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 952 (2004)
(mem.).
175
See RAUSTIALA, supra note 44, at 169.
169
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1. Padilla v. Yoo.—Jose Padilla, although a U.S. citizen, has become
something of a mascot for GWOT victims.176 Padilla’s Bivens claim, however, filed against former Deputy Attorney General in the Office of Legal
Counsel John Yoo, sought a remedy that was not available in his prior
suits—monetary compensation.177 Holding both that a new Bivens cause of
action was warranted—the legislature had not provided an alternative remedy and no “special factors counsel[ed] hesitation”—and that qualified
immunity was not available to Yoo, the district court advanced Padilla’s Bivens claims past summary judgment.178
Officials arrested Padilla in 2002 at Chicago O’Hare Airport pursuant
to a material witness warrant.179 While Padilla’s motion to vacate the warrant was pending, President Bush declared Padilla an “enemy combatant”
and ordered him taken into protective custody.180 Executive officials detained Padilla without charge for nearly four years at a military brig in
South Carolina.181 For two of those years, officials denied Padilla access to
counsel and the outside world.182 Padilla’s Bivens complaint alleged that his
detention and abusive interrogation183 violated his right to due process, his
right to legal counsel, and his right to be free from unconstitutional seizures, detentions, and cruel punishment.184 Padilla alleged that Yoo was
personally culpable for the systematic program of illegal detentions and interrogations that dictated Padilla’s treatment.185
The district court recognized Padilla’s novel Bivens claim since it
could not identify an alternative remedy or any preclusive special factors.186
As a preliminary matter, its decision to recognize the cause of action supports the viability of Bivens claims for GWOT victims going forward.187 In
176

See, e.g., WITTES, supra note †, at 180 (“[I]t has become somewhat fashionable to describe Padilla . . . as a small-fry victim of government overreaction . . . .”).
177
Complaint ¶ 6, Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 08-0035) [hereinafter Padilla Complaint].
178
Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1019–25, 1038, 1039.
179
Id. at 1012–13.
180
Id. at 1013.
181
Id.
182
See id. at 1014.
183
See id. (providing a complete list of techniques allegedly used against the petitioner, including
sleep and sensory deprivation, exposure to extreme temperatures and noxious fumes, and long-term
shackling).
184
See Padilla Complaint, supra note 177, ¶ 2; see also Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1016–17 (providing a complete breakdown of the claims Padilla asserted).
185
Padilla Complaint, supra note 177, ¶ 3. When Yoo’s “torture memos” became public, scholars,
politicians, and the public fiercely criticized his legal reasoning; some called for his imprisonment. See,
e.g., Margulies, supra note 12, at 234; Maria L. La Ganga, Scholar Calmly Takes Heat for His Memos
on Torture, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at A1.
186
See Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1019–30.
187
But see, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 56365 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (refusing, based
on special factors, to recognize a Bivens remedy against officials allegedly responsible for the extraordi-
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addressing Yoo’s qualified immunity defense, the court cited both Saucier
and Pearson before proceeding to discuss the constitutional merits of each
of Padilla’s claims.188 Unlike the majority of lower courts,189 the district
court in Padilla apparently was unaffected by temptations of judicial avoidance. The court made quick work of finding that Padilla’s detention and
treatment had violated his constitutional rights.190 The court further held
that the law governing the civilian prison context clearly established the unconstitutionality of Padilla’s detention and treatment; assigning Padilla a
special designation did not erase his citizen protections.191 The nascent nature of citizen “enemy combatant” designations at the time of Yoo’s conduct did not justify ignorance or dismissal of basic civil constitutional
rights.192 The court rejected Yoo’s defense of qualified immunity.193 Less
than three months later, the Ninth Circuit lent credence to the use of a merits-first analysis in detainees’ Bivens actions.
2. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft.—In 2003, officials arrested U.S. citizen Abdullah al-Kidd at a Dulles airport ticket counter pursuant to a material witness warrant.194 Executive officials never called al-Kidd to testify195 but
held him in various prisons for sixteen days, during which time he claims
that he was only allowed out of his cell for two hours each day and that his
cell was lit for twenty-four hours each day, and imposed supervised release
for an additional fourteen months.196 Within months of his release, al-Kidd
had lost his job and separated from his wife.197 Al-Kidd alleged that thenAttorney General John Ashcroft had created a policy for using the federal
material witness statute as a pretext for arresting and detaining terrorism
suspects.198
When the Ninth Circuit analyzed Ashcroft’s qualified immunity defense, it acknowledged its recently rejuvenated discretion to abort the
nary rendition of the alien plaintiff to Syria, where he claimed he was tortured), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3409 (2010).
188
See Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1031–38.
189
See discussion supra Part I.B.
190
See Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1034–38.
191
See id. at 1036–38.
192
See id. at 1037.
193
See id. at 1038.
194
Al-Kidd v. Gonzales (al-Kidd I), No. 05-093, 2006 WL 5429570, at *1 (D. Idaho Sept. 27,
2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft (al-Kidd II), 580 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir.
2009), rev’d, al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
195
Al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 954.
196
Id. at 953.
197
Id. at 95354.
198
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ¶¶ 8994, al-Kidd I, 2006 WL 5429570 (No. 05-093),
2005 WL 975750. Plaintiff al-Kidd pointed to Ashcroft’s press briefings, internal DOJ memoranda, and
at least one FBI statement touting the arrest of al-Kidd as a success in U.S. efforts to dismantle terrorist
networks. Al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 954–55.
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Saucier sequence but, like the Padilla court, chose to address the constitutional question anyway.199 It applied the Saucier sequence, extolling its
special value in promoting constitutional development and referencing its
propriety for addressing detainee rights that do not frequently arise in alternative legal proceedings.200
In invoking Pearson, the Ninth Circuit legitimized two important reasons why Saucier sequencing is imperative to GWOT victims’ rights adjudication. First, it noted that GWOT civil rights claims belong in the
“especially valuable” category that the Pearson court had urged would still
benefit from application of the two-pronged test.201 Second, it appreciated
the notice-giving value of two-step qualified immunity holdings.202 Ultimately, the court held that al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment right to be free
from pretextual use of the material witness statute to detain him had been
violated203 and that this right was clearly established when Ashcroft promulgated the strategy.204 The Ninth Circuit denied Ashcroft qualified immunity.205 In doing so, it cemented the Ninth Circuit’s support for merits-first
qualified immunity analysis in detainee Bivens actions.
The Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit on both the question of
whether Ashcroft’s alleged pretextual use of material witness warrants violated the Fourth Amendment and the question of whether the unconstitutionality of this practice was clearly established at the time of al-Kidd’s
199

See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 964. The district court had issued its qualified immunity opinion before Pearson revoked mandatory Saucier sequencing, but the Ninth Circuit still exercised Pearson discretion because it reviewed the qualified immunity claim de novo after the Supreme Court’s Pearson
decision. See id. at 956. The al-Kidd II court did not consider the propriety of the Bivens cause of action because Ashcroft had filed an interlocutory appeal of his immunity claims. Id. Because Ashcroft’s
Supreme Court petition involved only his motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, the Supreme Court did not address the propriety of extending a Bivens action to al-Kidd. See al-Kidd III, 131
S. Ct. at 2079.
200
Al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 964 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009)).
201
Id. (“[T]he two-step Saucier analysis in the traditional sequence . . . is especially valuable in addressing constitutional questions such as the one at hand, ‘that do not frequently arise in cases in which a
qualified immunity defense is unavailable.’” (quoting Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818)).
202
Id. (“[T]he two-step Saucier analysis in the traditional sequence . . . ‘promotes the development
of constitutional precedent . . . .’” (quoting Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818)).
203
Id. at 970. The court rejected the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment “conditions of confinement”
claim because he had not sufficiently shown Ashcroft’s plausible personal involvement in setting the
harsh conditions. See id. at 979.
204
See id. at 970–72 (finding the right clearly established by dicta regarding material witness detentions, the definition of probable cause, the history and purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and perhaps
most uniquely, a footnote in a New York district court case calling out Ashcroft by name and describing
as illegitimate this reliance on the material witness statute to detain people presumed innocent under the
Constitution). The Ninth Circuit is willing to look to a broader range of decisional law than other circuits, see infra note 224, and the Supreme Court’s al-Kidd III opinion condemned the broadness of the
Ninth Circuit’s view in no uncertain terms, al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2084 (“We have repeatedly told
courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” (citation omitted)).
205
See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 973.

857

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

arrest and detention.206 However, the Court did not disapprove of the Ninth
Circuit’s use of the merits-first approach to Ashcroft’s qualified immunity
claim; it acknowledged that its Pearson decision gave lower courts discretion on this analysis and asserted its authority to review whatever rulings
lower courts decide to issue.207 As Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence suggested,208 the Court’s decision to consider both prongs of the Ninth Circuit’s
qualified immunity analysis when the second prong alone would have provided grounds for a resolution of the case allies the Court with the Ninth
Circuit’s approach. The Court’s adjudication of the Fourth Amendment
merits issue shirked constitutional avoidance principles in favor of elaborating the law—here, determining that this use of material witness warrants is
not constitutionally condemned209 and implying that officials may pursue
this course of conduct again in the future.
Further, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s broad view of what
types of legal authority can clearly establish a constitutional rule.210 “Absent controlling authority[,] a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” is required, and neither solitary district court holdings, let alone
their dicta, nor broad purposes of constitutional provisions can clearly establish a legal standard.211 The inability of district court holdings or less
persuasive authorities to clearly establish legal principles that can guide officials’ conduct makes merits-first analysis at the circuit level even more
important. Thus, despite overturning the ultimate outcome of al-Kidd II,
the Supreme Court’s al-Kidd III reasoning may amplify the call for Saucier
sequencing in some cases.
Padilla v. Yoo and al-Kidd II, as written, are unlikely to persuade other
courts to abandon their constitutional avoidance tendencies. First, both cases involved U.S. citizens captured and detained on U.S. soil, which differentiates them from many of the cases likely to give rise to GWOT Bivens
claims. The al-Kidd II court, however, in explicitly discussing the value of
the two-step approach for cases like this GWOT Bivens action, showed that
al-Kidd’s citizenship was not the cause for its adoption of the Saucier sequence. Furthermore, a plaintiff’s U.S. citizenship does not give a court a
reason to choose the less efficient two-step mechanism. Finding that the
right was clearly established when it was violated without considering the
first constitutional-right prong would equally vindicate the citizen plaintiff
206

Al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2085.
Id. at 2080.
208
See id. at 2089–90 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“We have never considered
whether an official’s subjective intent matters for purposes of the Fourth Amendment in [this] novel
context, and we need not and should not resolve that question in this case. All Members of the Court
agree that, whatever the merits of the underlying Fourth Amendment question, Ashcroft did not violate
clearly established law.”).
209
Id. at 2080–83 (majority opinion).
210
Id. at 2083–85.
211
Id.
207
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and equally acknowledge the existence of the violation and the right at
hand. More importantly, other courts understandably will want an explanation as to why the concerns that led the Supreme Court to retract the Saucier mandate in the first place do not counsel against applying the merits-first
sequence in the detainees’ Bivens cases.
IV. RESPONDING TO THE CRITICS
A. Why Saucier’s Potential Dangers Are Less Compelling in the Global War
on Terror
Back in 2001, courts and scholars did not respond uniformly to Saucier’s mandatory two-step analysis. Many harshly criticized the prescription
of merits-first adjudication based on fundamental principles of resource
conservation and constitutional passivity thought to govern the federal judiciary. Foreseeably, these critics might disagree with using the Saucier sequence even in cases the Pearson Court declared would still benefit from it.
The familiar arguments against Saucier sequencing, however, are not compelling in the GWOT Bivens context.
Critics have argued that Saucier sequencing’s potential to simultaneously declare a right and yet deny recovery because that right was not
clearly established violates the famous Marbury v. Madison principle that
“where there is a right, there must be a remedy.”212 However, Marbury itself undermines the strictness of any right–remedy principle.213 The Marbury Court resolved a number of significant constitutional questions
without ultimately awarding any remedy.214 The right–remedy rule may
rank below the need for a “general structure” of constitutional remedies to
ensure the government behaves lawfully.215 This hierarchy of right–remedy
understanding conforms to contemporary jurisprudence and facilitates the
development of constitutional law.216 Because Saucier sequencing permits
212

See, e.g., Leong, supra note 63, at 702–06 & n.38 (quoting Marbury’s right–remedy maxim and
explaining judges’ potential cognitive dissonance in recognizing a right without granting a remedy in
Saucier analyses). See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (holding that
legal rights, when violated, must have remedies); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 87–88 (1999) (introducing scholarly protest to the absence of a remedy
in any constitutional adjudication).
213
See John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional Rulings
in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 419 (1999).
214
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1800–01 (1991).
215
See Jeffries, supra note 212, at 88–90 (quoting and discussing Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 214,
at 1736, but also arguing that full individual remediation should remain the ideal even if it is sometimes
subverted in the name of securing broader constitutional rights development). The D.C. Circuit recently
agreed that constitutional law does not always reflect the Marbury maxim: “Not every violation of a
right yields a remedy, even when the right is constitutional.” Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1027
(D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (mem.).
216
Jeffries, supra note 212, at 88–90.
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courts to recognize a novel right without awarding a remedy, courts can
elaborate and update constitutional understandings at a lower cost to executive officials who were unaware at the time that their conduct was unconstitutional.217
Some observers contend that Saucier’s vision of qualified immunity
may leave constitutional tort plaintiffs little incentive to sue. In some cases,
their suits may only subsidize the development of constitutional law that
will benefit not them, but those on whom government officials may act in
the future.218 “Precedent-seeking law firms” and other third-party organizations, however, likely will offset plaintiffs’ reluctance to sue.219 This has
been the case with Guantánamo litigation to date. Major U.S. law firms and
ideological rights-supportive groups have represented the Guantánamo detainees,220 and there is no reason to believe their interest in publicity, or their
generosity, will cease to exist when detainees want to file Bivens actions to
recover for their constitutional injuries.
Other commentators maintain that Saucier decisions about the constitutional merits of claims that ultimately fail on “clearly established”
grounds are dicta that should not govern the outcomes of future cases.221 Of
course, viewing these rights decisions as nonprecedential would erode the
constitutional-development value of Saucier sequencing. The first-prong
articulation of a constitutional right is what deters future violations of the
right and takes away officials’ qualified immunity defenses in future suits
for violations of the right. According to the Supreme Court’s recent Camreta v. Greene decision, this “significant future effect on the conduct of
public officials . . . and the policies of the government units to which they
belong”222 means that first-prong constitutional determinations cannot logi-

217

See id. at 99–100 (arguing that qualified immunity analysis “allows courts to embrace [constitutional] innovation without the potentially paralyzing cost of full remediation” for officials’ past violations).
218
See Kontorovich, supra note 51, at 810; see also Landau, supra note 132, at 675 (“It would not
be a stretch therefore to argue that many of the detainees—if they could choose—might be better off
with a procedural resolution than a decision of substance.”).
219
See Kontorovich, supra note 51, at 809–10.
220
See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2007, at A1 (reporting that Michael Ratner, from the Center for Constitutional Rights, had received offers to aid in detainee representation from “about 500 lawyers from about 120 law firms”); Pro Bono,
COVINGTON
&
BURLING
LLP,
http://www.cov.com/probonooverview/probono.aspx?show=
morehighlights (last visited Aug. 21, 2011) (reporting that the firm represents fourteen men detained at
Guantánamo Bay); Pro Bono & Public Service—Guantanamo Bay, JENNER & BLOCK,
http://www.jenner.com/probono/probono.asp?id=000014186424 (last visited Aug. 20, 2011) (reporting
that its lawyers had represented more than a dozen Guantánamo Bay detainees).
221
See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Reviving Saucier: Prospective Interpretations of Criminal Laws,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 75960 (2007).
222
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2011).
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cally be classified as “mere dicta or ‘statements in opinions.’”223 Even
where the second-prong analysis finds the rights were not clearly established, constitutional decisions can still notify officials of what constitutional rights exist and what conduct may violate them.224 Indeed, the United
States has claimed that a first-prong constitutional merits ruling can “ha[ve]
an effect similar to an injunction or a declaratory judgment against the government as a whole.”225 In turn, this notice can chip away at any future
qualified immunity claims that the unconstitutionality of the kind of detentions they considered was not clearly established in 2009.226
Given the purely prospective value of recognizing a constitutional right
that was not clearly established, some characterize such decisions as impermissible advisory opinions.227 Similarly, they claim that where the defendant official is confident either that the constitutional right at issue was
not clearly established, or that it does not exist at all, the official may de223

Id. (quoting California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987)). But see id. at 2037 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a lower court’s ruling on the constitutional merits of a qualified immunity
claim, where that court goes on to find the constitutional rule not clearly established and thus awards the
defendant qualified immunity, constitutes a dictum “not to be treated as a judgment standing on its
own”).
224
See Sampsell-Jones, supra note 221, at 759–60; see also Melissa Armstrong, Note, Rule Pragmatism: Theory and Application to Qualified Immunity Analysis, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 107,
126–27 (2004) (“Even assuming that dicta are less reliable, the Second Circuit offers at least a partial
mitigation of its own accuracy concern. As long as everyone understands that the finding of a constitutional violation is dictum not binding on a future court facing a similar fact pattern, the likelihood that
the first court was mistaken presents less of a danger. In other words, the dictum of the first case merely
puts officials on notice that certain conduct probably violates rights, removing the availability of qualified immunity, but does not burden them in the second case with binding precedent on point about the
existence of a rights violation.” (footnote omitted)).
The Supreme Court has not firmly established the sources of decisional law a court may consult in
determining whether a right has been clearly established. See Catlett, supra note 152, at 1041. Controlling precedent or a “robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” that does not conflict with controlling precedent suffices to clearly establish a legal rule. Al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011)
(quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)). The Court has implied that cases outside the controlling circuit might inform the analysis. Catlett, supra note 152, at 1041–42. Some federal circuits,
including the Ninth Circuit, have recognized dicta as a source of decisional law that can establish a constitutional right as clearly established, the broadest standard employed by the circuits, id. at 1048, but the
Supreme Court rejects this “high level of generality,” see al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2084.
225
Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae at 13, Camreta, 131 S. Ct. 2020).
226
See id. at 2030 (majority opinion) (explaining that first-prong constitutional rulings are “rulings
self-consciously designed to [affect government officials’ behavior] by establishing controlling law and
preventing invocations of immunity in later cases” and “with [the] Court’s permission, to promote clarity—and observance—of constitutional rules”). However, there may be a limitation on which courts’
qualified immunity decisions can serve these purposes: “district court decisions—unlike those from the
courts of appeals—do not necessarily settle constitutional standards or prevent repeated claims of qualified immunity.” Id. at 2033 n.7.
227
See, e.g., id. at 2037–38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that permitting Supreme Court review of first-prong constitutional rulings where an official prevails on his qualified immunity claim in
the second prong of the analysis amounts to issuing advisory opinions); Healy, supra note 61, at 902–04.
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cline to expend resources to argue the constitutional merits.228 While this
argument is compelling—surely, new constitutional law should only arise
out of hearty motions practices—it ignores government institutions’ strong
motivations to fight vigorously against the declaration of new constitutional
rights. Those rights, after all, could complicate their task of crafting constitutionally compliant policies and could expose their officials to liability.229
In practice, government defendants rarely decide not to contest a novel constitutional claim when asserting qualified immunity because the disputed
right is often a matter of “institutional concern.”230
The government defendants in GWOT Bivens cases are especially unlikely to forego arguing novel constitutional issues especially when the constitutional rights involve a new type of enemy engaged in a new and
potentially multigenerational type of war. Additionally, since few detainees
have brought Bivens claims thus far, it is doubtful that a lack of government
resources will preclude executive officials from fervently litigating the constitutional questions these suits raise. The high concentration of potentially
far-reaching constitutional implications in detainees’ Bivens actions further
supports this prediction.
Saucier sequencing also presents the problem of insulating from appellate review a court’s finding that a constitutional right exists. As the argument goes, because parties may appeal only adverse outcomes, a defendant
who wins on the “clearly established” prong cannot appeal a court’s constitutional finding even though, for many government officials, the court’s
recognition of a new constitutional right or contour of a constitutional right
is more detrimental than the case’s dismissal is beneficial.231 In May 2011,
the Supreme Court created an exception to the general rule against appeals
of favorable outcomes for qualified immunity cases, recognizing that they
228

See Healy, supra note 61, at 856 (“Because a ruling on the constitutional issue in these cases can
never affect the outcome, there is a greater risk that the [constitutional] issue will not be argued vigorously and that the Court’s decision will therefore be inadequately informed.”).
229
See, e.g., Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (pointing out the United States’
amicus curiae argument that first-prong constitutional rulings sometimes alter or control government
policy and officials’ conduct as much as an injunction or declaratory judgment would).
Indemnification practices further incentivize the government to argue fully the novel constitutional
right asserted in a detainee’s Bivens action. Cf. David Zaring, Personal Liability as Administrative Law,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313, 330–31 (2009) (explaining that individuals are rarely personally liable for
torts they commit in the course of their duties because of the government’s policy of indemnifying its
employees).
230
Greabe, supra note 213, at 435 (emphasis added). One commentator has pointed out that even
outside the GWOT context, the thousands of cases decided between 2001 and 2009 under Saucier have
not yielded obvious examples of disastrously uninformed dispositions. See Sampsell-Jones, supra note
221, at 761.
231
See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 67, at 414–17 (describing this phenomenon in the context of Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019 (1998), in which the Supreme Court declined to review a decision that the
Virginia Military Institute’s dinner prayer tradition was unconstitutional because the Fourth Circuit had
found that right was not clearly established and thus had granted the Institute qualified immunity); Jeffries, supra note 85, at 127–28 (same).
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represent “a special category when it comes to [the Supreme Court’s] review of appeals brought by winners.”232 The danger that novel constitutional rulings otherwise could be insulated from review might lead lower courts
to avoid articulating constitutional rulings in qualified immunity cases.233
The “regular policy of avoidance sometimes does not fit the qualified immunity situation because it threatens to leave standards of official conduct
permanently in limbo,”234 so an exception that “permit[s] lower courts to
avoid avoidance” was justified.235 As constructed, the exception requires
that the appealing litigant have a continuing “personal stake” in the appeal
to preserve the case or controversy.236 This personal stake exists in qualified immunity cases, the Court reasoned, because a first-prong constitutional ruling causes a government official to “either change the way he
performs his duties or risk a meritorious damages action.”237 In the wake of
Camreta, the unreviewability dilemma does not condemn Saucier sequencing.
Finally, any argument that Saucier sequencing’s mandatory first prong
is inefficient bears less weight given that a constitutional question’s adjudication in one case prevents the need for its adjudication in future cases.238
That said, Pearson acknowledges one possible exception to this: where the
constitutional question is already pending in a higher court.239 In the
GWOT context, there will undoubtedly be future cases. The U.S. struggle
to dismantle extremist terrorist regimes is a long-term endeavor. Osama bin
Laden’s death has not dismantled al Qaeda’s increasingly diffuse network
of affiliates, and in general, terrorist networks have become self-reliant and
largely independent of central leadership.240 U.S. strategies will continue to
232

Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2030 (majority opinion). Some scholars have been calling for this type of
narrow exception. See Jeffries, supra note 85, at 127 n.47 (quoting Bunting, 541 U.S. at 1023 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari)); Leong, supra note 63, at 678–79. Moreover, this exception is
congruent with the existing exception to the final judgment rule, which allows officials to file interlocutory appeals of denials of motions to dismiss or denials of summary judgment if their appeals pertain to
qualified immunity. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 825 (2010).
This exception is sure to generate vigorous debate because it effectively forgives what have traditionally been considered deficiencies of constitutionally mandated standing requirements. See, e.g., Orin
Kerr, Camreta v. Greene and Article III Standing, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 26, 2011, 2:16 PM),
http://volokh.com/2011/05/26/camreta-v-greene-and-article-iii-standing. Indeed, several Justices objected on such grounds. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2037–34 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
233
See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2030–32 (majority opinion).
234
Id. at 2031.
235
Id.
236
Id. at 2029.
237
Id.
238
See Leong, supra note 63, at 680–82.
239
See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 819 (2009).
240
See, e.g., Nathan Freier, Bin Laden’s Gone: What Now for Defense Policy?, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (May 4, 2011), http://csis.org/publication/bin-ladens-gone-what-now-
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include the detention of suspected al Qaeda terrorist cell members and Taliban fighters even if wartime exigencies abate. Just as surely, some of these
detentions will be mistakes. There is no long-run efficiency to be gained, or
cost to be saved, by omitting Saucier first-prong constitutional adjudications now.
B. Why the Courts Should Not Defer: The Judiciary’s Role in the Global
War on Terror
Since GWOT victims’ rights are unlikely to develop outside of Bivens
actions, courts should follow the Saucier sequence when adjudicating the
qualified immunity defenses raised in these suits. The Saucier sequence
contemplates an active rights-defining and notice-giving role for the judiciary despite the availability of a one-pronged test that can support a disposition. In this way, the Saucier sequence betrays popularized principles of
judicial avoidance.241 The familiar call for judicial passivity is even louder
where cases involve executive wartime conduct. This section justifies the
Judiciary Branch’s role in elaborating and defining GWOT victims’ rights
that will constrain and, more importantly, guide executive decisionmaking.
Judicial passivity is not always a virtue. “Minimalist” judicial philosophies come with unbalanced costs in the form of cyclic litigation, hardships
on individual plaintiffs, and the consumption of resources.242 Furthermore,
avoidance in the lower courts leads to a less robust body of lower court law
for the Supreme Court to mine for an ideal rule.243 Finally, the propriety of
more gradual constitutional development is not at all clear.244 Several historical periods have seen rapid and profound changes in constitutional jurisprudence that have survived the march of time, such as the equal
protection revolution of the mid-1900s.245 When judicial intervention clashes with executive wartime prerogatives, however, separation-of-powers
principles usually sway in favor of less judicial participation.
One of the primary objections to the judicial review of executive actions is that the possibility of liability will impede swift executive decidefense-policy; Eric Schmitt, Bin Laden’s Death Doesn’t Mean the End of Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES (May
2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/world/asia/03terror.html.
241
See Leong, supra note 63, at 67678.
242
See Fiss, supra note 137, at 657; see also Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 301, 303–12 (2009) (providing a thoughtful
discussion about how strict adherence to clear rules during times of emergency can increase national security).
243
See Catlett, supra note 152, at 1051 (“Sometimes a legal issue is better fleshed out when it is
considered by multiple judges with differing viewpoints. . . . ‘The many circuit courts act as the “laboratories” of new or refined legal principles . . . providing the Supreme Court with a wide array of approaches to legal issues and thus, hopefully, with the raw material from which to fashion better
judgments.’” (quoting J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution
Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 929 (1983)) (footnote omitted)).
244
See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 214, at 1803–04 & n.396.
245
See Greabe, supra note 213, at 435–36.
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sionmaking and deter or delay action when it is needed most. Judicially
imposed liability may, it famously has been said, “dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge
of their duties.”246 These policy arguments against an active Judiciary
Branch become considerably louder when judges seek to review executive
activities during war.
The potential for detrimental executive hesitation does not mean, however, that the judiciary must sit idly by while actions taken in the name of
national security and victory in warfare threaten the liberties these lethal
and expensive wars seek to protect. It is, after all, the judiciary’s fundamental purpose to “say what the law is.”247 Arguments that the judiciary
should have a seat at the metaphorical table in wartime248 are even stronger
in the context of this new, unfamiliar, and potentially long-term global
war.249 This war is “amorphous” and is fought against an ill-defined enemy.250 In this type of war, an outside minority—here, the Guantánamo detainees—will likely bear the burden of our fearful, self-preservationist
reactions.251
The federal courts have expansive authority to assess the legality of
both U.S. domestic and extraterritorial detention and other executive conduct.252 While decisions to commit troops are presidential prerogatives, determinations about how the Constitution applies to extraterritorial activities
may best be addressed by judges.253 Whether the judiciary constitutionally
can review executive detention and military activities, however, does not
settle whether it should.
The infrequency of wartime opportunities for legal issues to ripen and
come before the Supreme Court, coupled with the need to imbue the law
governing wartime activities with contemporary constitutional sensibilities,
also militates in favor of reasonable nonavoidance policies during wartime.254 Courts must review wartime activity in order to bring wartime laws
246

Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Moreover, judicial involvement will
not undermine the military as an authoritarian institution. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in
Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 442, 460–61 (1999).
248
See Fiss, supra note 137, at 659.
249
To be sure, some commentators disagree. See, e.g., WITTES, supra note †, at 257–58 (arguing
that trying to answer “war on terror” dilemmas with the Constitution and past precedents is “an illusion”
and that, in this new war, “we are the Founders”). Wittes acknowledges, however, that, in the long run,
a seat at the table for the Judiciary Branch could at most “prove harmless” to the Executive Branch’s
ability to do its job. Id. at 123.
250
Fiss, supra note 137, at 659.
251
Id.
252
Pfander, supra note 94, at 499.
253
See Leah E. Kraft, Comment, The Judiciary’s Opportunity to Protect International Human
Rights: Applying the U.S. Constitution Extraterritorially, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1073, 1102–03 (2004).
254
Professor Jeffries argues that excluding judges from qualified immunity analyses could lead “the
Constitution [to] be defined not by what judges, in their wisdom, think it does or should mean, but by
247
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into compliance with constitutional understandings that have evolved since
the creation of previous wartime jurisprudence. When President Bush and
the DOJ were called upon to present the legal justifications for the detentions at Guantánamo Bay, they were relegated to discussing fifty-year-old
precedents.255 One case they relied upon, Johnson v. Eisentrager,256 had
been meaningfully discussed by the Supreme Court only once in the five
decades between its writing and September 11, 2001.257 The absence of
subsequent opportunities for courts to clarify Eisentrager, namely wartime
detentions, had amplified its original lack of clarity.258
Nonavoidance policies serve a critical notice-giving function. By saying “what the law is” at the few and intermittent wartime opportunities the
judiciary has, the judiciary guarantees that, when facing the next threat, the
President will be able to rely on constitutional law that reflects, at worst, the
law at the time of the most recent war rather than law that has not been updated in decades. In the absence of this judicial guidance, “an Executive
solicitous of civil liberties has no way of knowing how to structure a detention policy to minimize its potential unconstitutionality.”259 President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s approach to the World War II Japanese internments
and Attorney General Francis Biddle’s statements are demonstrative:
Biddle . . . wrote that “the constitutional difficulty” of the Japanese internments did not seem to worry President Roosevelt. “That was a question of
law, which ultimately the Supreme Court must decide. And meanwhileprobably a long meanwhilewe must get on with the war.” This
shows that Presidents can anticipate and exploit the Court’s procrastination.
On the other hand, it also suggests Roosevelt would have heeded judicial guidance had it been available. He was wrong about one thing: A Supreme Court
practicing abstention need not decide anything. Thus “meanwhile” has lasted
to this very day.260

President Bush’s detention decisions in the wake of the September 11,
2001 attacks similarly suffered from a lack of prescient constitutional
precedent. The Eisentrager-based belief that Guantánamo Bay would
shield operations there from judicial scrutiny significantly motivated President Bush’s decision to hold suspected al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban figh-
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ters there.261 These examples highlight why courts should aim to provide
timely and decipherable wartime opinions to the other decisionmaking
branches during wartime.262
Moreover, judicial avoidance maneuvers can bind the judiciary to a
certain decisional path without a full deliberative process. As Professor
Jenny Martinez has explained,
[T]he Court’s procedural approach does not leave these substantive questions
genuinely open for de novo review some other day. Having invited Congress
to fix things, for example, the Court has put itself in an institutionally weaker
position to later strike down Congress’s fix on rights-based grounds. Moreover, having applied the law of war to al Qaeda detainees, the Court has made it
difficult to later find that the “war on terror” may not really be a war at all.
And the Court has done so without the benefit of fully considering the substantive or rights-based arguments.263

The Judiciary’s task of defining rights and educating the Executive, in
many situations, would be subsidiary to the Legislature’s duty to promulgate legislation that serves these purposes. In this new war, however, the
legislature has failed utterly to delineate constitutional limits for the Executive Branch.264 Since the Obama Administration has decided not to request
congressional articulation of the contours of the United States’ noncriminal
detention scheme,265 Congress is unlikely to do so in the near future. Moreover, the judiciary maintains an apolitical duty to protect the rights of minorities especially at times when the legislature, practically speaking,
261
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cannot do so for fear of constituent ire. Few savvy politicians would
present or support a bill to establish meaningful limits on the military’s or
federal intelligence agencies’ power to detain suspected terrorists on the basis that those terrorists have inviolable rights. This may be especially true
after the killing of Osama bin Laden by U.S. Navy SEALs, a military success that spawned patriotic demonstrations and celebrations across the
United States;266 few politicians will be willing to dampen the long-awaited
sense of victory with hand-tying legislation.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court’s Pearson decision gives courts the option to avoid deciding the constitutional issues underlying the detainees’
suits, an option sure to be popular given the stakes, the Court also emphasized that at times constitutional development and notice-giving will still rely on the Saucier two-prong protocol. It reiterated the importance of this
subset of cases in Camreta v. Greene.267 Because GWOT detainees otherwise have no opportunities to mount a meaningful challenge to executive
detention policies,268 Bivens actions present one such scenario. Constitutional adjudication in these cases is even more important because the official conduct being challenged is likely to involve technologies and methods
the Executive Branch has never before deployed, at least not in a wartime
context. Therefore, courts can serve not only a notice-giving purpose, but
also a constitutional-updating purpose.269 Employing the two-step Saucier
approach in these cases will also avoid repeated unconstitutional abuses
that, in the absence of a judicial ruling to “clearly establish” them as such,
could continue into perpetuity with court after court deciding that any rights
the detainees may have are not clearly established.270 For these reasons, the
lower courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead and invoke Saucier sequencing when deciding the validity of qualified immunity defenses raised
in detainee Bivens actions. If the lower courts continue to decline to do so,
the Supreme Court should clarify that detainees’ Bivens actions are precisely the type of claim for which Pearson declares Saucier analysis to be “especially valuable.”
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